Economists provide sometimes contradictory information about economic systems that contribute to policy design. How does one value this type of knowledge? A political-economic game is presented that allows for reinforcing and contradictory research messages. Policy makers are assumed to follow a Bayesian decision theory process and the model is tested with quantitative estimates of the value of research on the degree of bias in the Consumer Price Index. Most economists agree that a bias exists, but published estimates vary widely. A blue-ribbon panel of economists recommended revisions to how the index is calculated, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics subsequently made revisions that differed from their original plans, but how much influence did the panel really have on the revisions? (JEL Z00)
I. INTRODUCTION
Few economists would doubt that their research and advice has value to society. But does the value change when the results of similar work are in circulation? Does it make a difference if the other work draws similar or different conclusions? Economists provide knowledge of how economic systems work and the consequences of economic actions, often directly or indirectly contributing to policy design. How does one value this type of knowledge and assistance, particularly when several sets of results or interpretations of empirical data are available? Clearly, not all economists-or the value of their research programs-are equal. If research results from more prestigious sources get greater weight in policy considerations, does that influence the value of the research? Partly driven by accountability concerns, economists have at times evaluated impacts of technological innovations (e.g., Evenson 1967; Griliches 1958; Mansfield et al. 1977; Scherer 1999) , but for the most part have steered clear of attempts to assess impacts of social science research, including economics.
Reluctance to try to quantify the value of economics is understandable. Economics research (ER) produces a diverse set of difficultto-measure outputs that are embedded in theories, recommendations, institutions, or quantitative methods. These outputs are often not valued in the market and may be aimed at one or more objectives associated with efficiency, risk, or distribution. These diverse outputs and multiple objectives complicate the assessment of aggregate research programs, forcing the evaluator to consider specific research products and objectives. Establishing causality between ER and specific policies is a challenge because ER is usually only one of many inputs in a decision-making process that involves political and other factors.
This article presents a relatively simple political-economic model for assessing the contributions of ER. The model allows for multiple groups of researchers with different levels of influence over a policy center. It is tested using a Bayesian decision theory (BDT) approach to value research information. An example is provided that concerns research by economists on the degree of bias in the U.S. Consumer Price Index (CPI). Conclusions are drawn about the usefulness of the BDT approach for assessing social science research that may be focused on one topic but is completed by multiple sources.
Few attempts have been made to evaluate ER, and these are primarily related to agricultural economics. Just et al. (2002) , Freebairn (1976) , Hayami and Peterson (1972) , and others have assessed the impacts of commodity outlook research. Gardner (2004) , Alwang (1997, 2004) , and Ryan (2004) have evaluated the benefits of agricultural research directed at policy or institutional change. These studies and others have concluded that the output of ER is information. Therefore, approaches for valuing information, such as BDT, may be fruitful for valuing ER (Lindner 1987; Schimmelpfennig and Norton 2003) .
ER can help policy makers by providing information that improves their ability to predict outcomes of their actions. When different information on the same topic reaches policy makers from multiple sources, no one source may be definitive. Even if this information leads to greater uncertainty, the information may be better than what was available before and have positive value if strongly held prior but erroneous beliefs are called into question (Hirshleifer 1971) . If the information is actually worse, the possibility does exist that it may have no value or negative value. Economic efficiency is a convenient metric for valuing this information, which substitutes knowledge and analytical skill for the more expensive process of learning by trial and error (Ruttan 1984) .
These characteristics of ER highlight the need for a theoretical framework that captures (1) the impacts of ER on policy makers' and private decision makers' subjective beliefs about the consequences of actions, (2) the economic efficiency or welfare effects of those actions, and (3) the political-economic interactions between policy makers and the information produced by multiple ER groups.
II. A THEORETICAL MODEL FOR VALUING RESEARCH INFORMATION FROM MULIPLE SOURCES
The framework for this Bayesian politicaleconomy game draws on Zusman (1995) and Hirshleifer and Riley. A variety of feasible actions are assumed open to a decision maker, Figure 1 . The consequences (c xs ) of those actions depend on the (unconditional) prior probabilities (p s ) of different states of nature, s ¼ (1, . . . , S) occurring (R s p s ¼ 1). The expected utility derived by each decision maker is:
where v(Á) is a preference-scaling function. When ER produces new information that is made available to decision maker(s), a judgment is formed concerning the probability that the information is true. Decision makers are then assumed to follow an updating process to convert prior probabilities into posterior probabilities and reassess the actions.
Individual decision makers choose different actions (or policy instruments); but only one action can actually be represented in the economy. To choose one action (x) for the economy, a policy-making center is assumed constitutionally authorized to select the value of the policy instrument. The center can be influenced by ER conducted internally by economists employed by the center (public ER) and externally by economists at universities and think tanks (private ER). The various research sources may produce conflicting messages.
1 In FIGURE 1 Bayesian Political-Economic Model for Impacts of Multiple-Source Economic Research 1. Each source, or message service, will generally have only one message on a specific topic as economists at (nonuniversity) public institutions and nongovernmental organizations usually must obtain clearance to publish their results, whereas economists at universities often avoid collaborations with those they disagree with. Economists are assumed to choose research methods based on social or scientific grounds, not for strategic manipulation of policy center choices. addition, because the chosen value of the policy instrument affects the well-being of many decision makers, those with similar preferences for policy outcomes may organize into interest groups. These groups can attempt to influence the policy center, and the objective function of the ith interest group is:
where l i is the cost to group i of employing its means of power over the center (lobbying). The preferences of the center are explicitly influenced by the interest groups, with the center having the objective function:
is the effect of lobbying by the ith interest group, and d i is a dichotomous variable indicating whether a reward policy
is being employed by the interest group (Zusman 1995) . The units of z i (Á) are in the utility of the policy center, whereas the lobbying cost (l) is in terms of expected utility.
To balance the demands of different interest groups, the solution value of the policy instrument (x) maximizes a policy governance function:
where b i represents the political influence that interest group i has over the policy center. The political-economic-equilibrium values of the x variables are determined through a bargaining game between interest groups and the policy center. Payoffs to reward and penalizing policies determine equilibrium strategies in games with the structure of (2)-(4) under certainty (Harsanyi 1963) . Zusman (1976) extended this result to show that in Nash cooperative equilibrium, the interest groups follow a symmetric reward policy (d i ¼ a). He also showed that noncooperative equilibria do not persist in games of this form.
The introduction of new ER results may cause the policy center and the interest groups to revise their prior probabilities about the consequences of specific policy instruments (x); if they believe there is a positive probability of the research message being true. In this way, new ER can cause the optimal policy action to change. The value of the new research information is the difference between the maximum value of the policy governance function with and without the information. It might be possible to measure this value with economic surplus.
Research messages may arise from multiple sources (public and private) but are always generated from basic theoretical findings, advances in research methods, and applied/ interdisciplinary research. Basic ER is generated by a research production function with the quantity of basic ER messages, M B, a function of current research funding, R B , and prior research funding, P B :
P B is a proxy for basic research capacity or the stock of basic ER, which might also influence research in areas other than economics. Messages from applied/interdisciplinary research (M A ) come from public and private sources and are a function of current applied research funding, R A , prior applied research support, P A , and prior basic research support, P B :
Applied research messages may depend on previous applied research results (M P ), but may conflict with those results as well as with other contemporaneous applied research messages. Besides entering through the revision of probabilities, research results might also indicate new possible actions (x) as shown in Figure 1 . The authors assume that political decisions concerning funding for research take place independently of the impact of research on probabilities and actions. If this assumption holds, the uncertainty in the model can be resolved before new political decisions are made, and Zusman's certainty results for the game will hold under certainty equivalence.
The value of a specific piece of ER is then a function of (1) the amount of applied/interdisciplinary research; (2) the amount of basic research; (3) the extent to which the M A are communicated to policy makers, causing them to revise their priors and perceived possible actions; (4) the outcomes of a political bargaining process; and (5) the influence that a specific ER message has compared to messages from other groups researching the same topic. The extent of the latter influence depends on the prestige of the ER group or in some cases possibly the agreement of research results with preselected politically acceptable outcomes.
2 There may be a higher level of interdependence among the components of the theoretical game than the authors have assumed. In particular, choices of research topics that result in additions to the stock of M A might be directly influenced by perceived political factors as well as by funding for basic research. Applied research might also affect the stock of basic research, most notably through the impact that high-visibility applied research results can have on the availability of funding for basic research, conditional on the political environment. The potential for these and other sources of interdependence to influence the value of ER obtained from the solution to a social planner's political-economic problem will be the topic of future research.
III. EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATIONS
To derive an actual value of ER, it is necessary to further consider the interaction between changes in market-level efficiency and levels of uncertainty. In the theoretical framework, efficiency was measured as the difference between the maximum value of the policy governance function (4) with and without the research information. Efficiency gains at the market level depend not only on the amount of uncertainty facing individuals and the extent of its reduction per micro-level decision maker (politician or researcher) but also on the degree of diffusion of various ER results and on the value of the affected economic activities. Reducing uncertainty about an economically trivial decision is worth little, even if the uncertainty was large and the reduction great. Unfortunately, much of the literature on the value of information focuses on the ex ante value of information to individual decision makers, and little attention has been given to the market level (possible exceptions include Bradford and Kelejian 1977, 1978) .
Another reason it is important to consider the market impacts of ER is that the market can affect the value of the information by causing economic agents to take actions that affect prices.
3 If large numbers of people act on the research information, market supplies and/or demands may be affected, and hence the value of that information might be measured in terms of changes in economic surplus. These changes could be compared to the cost of providing more accurate information from one or more sources. Even highly accurate information about likely consumer or producer behavior may have nonnegligible errors, and different research results from different sources may not be interpreted as being different by decision makers. Therefore an approach to valuing information would be helpful that allows the decision maker to learn and revise probabilities of uncertain events over time and to combine information from multiple sources. Hirshleifer and Riley (1992) discuss the potential usefulness of BDT for this purpose.
Decisions by economic agents or policy makers are based on subjective beliefs. BDT indicates how objective knowledge can lead individuals to revise those beliefs. By structuring the problem of valuing ER in terms of an economic surplus payoff matrix (as in Table 1) , and prior, joint, conditional, and posterior probability matrices, BDT may facilitate calculation of the value of information generated by ER messages from various sources. This value would be conditional on the degree to which the payoffs coincide with the distribution of political power among interest groups, (3) is 0. The authors make the simplifying assumption that R i z i (l i ,d i ) is 0 in the CPI example that follows because of the difficulty of measuring differences in political power.
Consequences of policy actions, with no new research messages that might cause individuals to revise their beliefs, are presented in Table 1 , along with the expected values of the various actions given the prior probabilities. If additional information becomes available to the policy maker from one or more sources and he or she has knowledge of the probability of the information from various sources being true, then he or she might follow a process to convert prior probabilities into posterior probabilities and reassess the policy action. 4 The process of deriving posterior probabilities can involve four probabilities in addition to the prior probability: (1) the (unconditional) probability of receiving research message m, (P(M) ¼ q m ); (2) the joint probability of state s and message m, (P(S)P(M | S) ¼ j ms ); (3) the conditional probability (likelihood) of message m given state s, (P(M | S) ¼ q m|s ); and (4) the conditional (posterior) probability of state s, given message m,
Breaking the process of obtaining these probabilities down into steps, it is first useful to consider the likelihood of the new interpreted information (research message m) being true. The likelihood matrix L, shown in Table 1 , shows the probability of any message given any state, q m|s. Each row in the likelihood matrix must sum to 1.
Given the likelihood matrix, the joint probability of state s and message m can then be calculated by multiplying L by the prior probabilities, thereby creating a joint probability matrix, (J ¼ [j sm ]), as shown in Table 1 . The sum of the joint probabilities across all messages and states is unity (R s,m j sm ¼ 1). For each state s, summing across each row horizontally in the J matrix gives the prior probabilities (R m j sm ¼ p s ), also called the marginal state probabilities that will also sum to 1. For each message m, summing vertically over the states gives the message probabilities (R s j sm ¼ q m ), also called the marginal message probabilities, shown in Table 1 .
The potential posterior probability matrix is then derived to provide the conditional probability of each state given any message m (p s|m ¼ j sm /q m ). The column sums of this submatrix are all unity. The posterior matrix gives an ex ante picture of all the alternative posterior distributions that might come about, depending on which possible ER messages are received. The process of revising probabilities is assumed to follow Bayes's theorem, which can be stated in several ways:
Given this belief revision process, (1) the higher the prior confidence (tighter the p s ), the more the posterior distribution will resemble the prior distribution; (2) the greater the amount of new evidence, the more the posterior distribution will resemble the likelihood function rather than the prior probabilities; and (3) the more surprising the evidence, the bigger the impact on the posterior probabilities (Hirshleifer and Riley 1992 ).
Bayes's theorem is easiest to apply to ER evaluation when the likelihoods are known or can be estimated from historical data. In cases where they cannot easily be estimated, it may be possible to elicit the likelihoods or even subjective posterior probabilities directly from decision makers as suggested by Gardner (2004) . The ease with which these probabilities can be obtained may be a determining factor when deciding whether to use BDT to value ER.
For each research program (or message service) characterized by a particular likelihood function L and prior beliefs p, the expected 
4. Personal biases could affect how different research results might be combined to form a research message. A single result confirming a long-held belief, for example, might receive greater weight from one decision maker even though the confidence in the source is the same as or even below that from another source.
value of its research information using a Bayesian analog of (1) is: X(l) ¼ R m R s p s|m q m v(c sm * ) ÿ R s p s v(c so * ) or the difference between expected utility over all messages with and without the information, where c sm * denotes the consequence (in state s) associated with the best action after receiving the information and c so * denotes the corresponding consequence for the best uninformed political action. To assess the consequences of choices made with that research information and the value of that information, a payoff matrix using posterior probabilities can be constructed, as shown in Table 1 . The payoffs are calculated as: b 11 ¼ c 11 p 11 þ c 12 p 21 þ c 13 p 31 , b 12 ¼ c 11 p 12 þ c 12 p 22 þ c 13 p 32 , and so on, and for policy makers would be influenced by the efforts of lobbyists. The optimal policy action, x*, is then selected for each research message and multiplied by its corresponding message probability, q m . These products are summed to arrive at the expected utility with the information. The expected utility without the information is then subtracted to arrive at the value of the message service or ER program. The payoffs, if represented by economic surplus values, enable calculation of aggregate social benefits due to the ER.
One advantage of the BDT framework as an empirical approach is that it explicitly links the value of information to an economic theory of uncertainty imbedded in the game theory model. A disadvantage is the need to estimate prior and conditional probabilities. In a few cases, these probabilities can be obtained from historical data, such as where subjective priors might be based on historical price movements, and conditional probabilities might be determined from past projections and actual states of nature that occurred. Gardner's approach of obtaining prior and conditional probabilities by subjective elicitation is an alternative; another possibility is eliciting posteriors rather than the likelihoods. Hindsight bias is a potentially important source of problems for the elicitation of prior probabilities. Fischhoff (2001, p. 549 ) documents some of the evidence of this problem and notes that biases may persist even for expert opinions like those discussed in the next section. A potential intervention that he raises to lessen the bias is the possibility of reminding subjects about uncertainties that might have existed when their priors were formed. Future research might consider how these could be communicated to policy experts without introducing additional biases.
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IV. APPLICATION TO RESEARCH ON THE BIAS IN THE CPI
To test the usefulness of BDT for quantifying the benefits of ER from multiple sources, the method was applied to research that economists have conducted on bias in the CPI. Economists generally agree that a bias exists, so the research message and updating of research information concerns the size of the bias. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (U.S. Department of Labor), the agency responsible for modifying the CPI, has a group of economists working on the problem, and an external panel of academic economists was appointed to evaluate the bias. Virginia Tech collected information on how the research results from each of these groups of economists were used by policy makers to develop a research message from the overall program. The authors also sought to determine how uncertain policy makers were about the size of the bias. A structured format was used to collect and analyze the information. A questionnaire was developed that included a brief description of the relevant body of research on CPI bias, objectives of the evaluation, specific results of the research program (possible messages), clientele for the research, decisions influenced by the research (including identification of states of nature and actions), and the nature of the research benefits. Using the same questionnaire for each interviewee, phone and personal interviews were conducted to elicit information from policy makers at the BLS and the Social Security Administration (SSA), who had used the CPI as a policy tool. Information from the interviews was used to determine messages and probabilities. Benefits were calculated using the structure in Table 1 . A brief description of each item is presented next.
The Relevant Research on Bias in the CPI
A number of economists have argued that the CPI, as measured by BLS, overstates inflation. The upward bias has arisen in part 5. Another possibility is to suggest that researchers conduct surveys of priors held by potential decision makers before conducting their original research, although final decsion makers are often difficult to identify ex ante.
because of the rapidly changing nature of the economy, and the sheer size of the task of gathering monthly data on thousands of goods whose quality may be changing and that are being sold by an evolving mix of retail outlets. New automobiles and computers do more than old automobiles and computers, and items that did not even exist one year can become significant purchases the next. Another problem is the use of fixed weights for aggregation that fail to account for (upper and lower level) consumer substitution among commodities, and the frequency with which the market basket of expenditure weights are updated (General Accounting Office [GAO] 1997). The various sources of bias were aggregated in the survey to increase the number of policy makers that could authoritatively answer one set of questions.
Results of CPI Research (Messages)
Economists began publishing estimates of the size of the bias in the CPI in 1994 (Moulton 1996, p. 160, table 1) . Alan Greenspan brought the issue into the balanced budget debate in January 1995. In mid-1995, the Senate Finance Committee appointed an advisory committee, the Boskin (et al.) Commission (1996) , to summarize the work being done by economists at BLS and elsewhere (Boskin et al. , 1998 Gordon 1999) . In December 1996, this blue-ribbon commission concluded that the CPI overstates the cost of living by about 1.1%.
Clientele for the Research Results
The BLS was the primary clientele for research on CPI bias, and in some cases the researchers were at the BLS. In fact, between December 1996 and June 1999, BLS made seven changes to the calculation of the CPI and announced three additional changes to be implemented (Kingsbury 2000) . The former Boskin Commission members indicated that between 0.2% and 0.37% of the bias had been eliminated through these changes (GAO 2000) .
Specific Decision(s) Influenced by the Research (States of Nature and Actions)
Three states of nature and three primary actions were identified with respect to revision of the CPI. The three states were that (1) bias in the CPI is between 0 and 0.3 bias, (2) bias is 0.3 to 0.8, and (3) bias is greater than 0.8. For each state, the first action was defined to coincide with steps actually taken between December 1996 and June 1999 that removed roughly 0.3 of the bias from the CPI. The second was to take actions to eliminate the remaining bias. A third potential action, never seriously considered according to the BLS, was to do nothing.
Nature of Research Benefits
As part of the process of evaluating specific types of revisions to the CPI, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that a 0.1% downward revision in the CPI would save $10.8 billion in federal expenditures over four years (Ungar and Bothwell 1997) . The BLS estimated that one type of revision, to update the market basket of weights, would cost about $3.1 million and that the multifaceted 1998 revision to the CPI would cost $66 million.
Data Needed for the Analysis
The data needed for analysis were: (1) cost and timing of specific actions regarding revisions to the CPI; (2) prior probabilities that the bias was less than 0.3, between 0.3 and 0.8, and greater than 0.8; (3) likelihood of the research message if the bias was less than 0.3, if it was between 0.3 and 0.8, and if it was greater than 0.8l and (4) benefit figures estimated by the CBO.
Interview Questions
Nine economists were interviewed, some of whom were involved in the research on bias in the CPI; most were policy makers who influenced changes in the CPI, and others worked for agencies whose programs were impacted by changes in the CPI and hence may have made adjustments to those programs based on the estimated bias. The institutional representation of these economists was fairly wide, including the BLS, the Brookings Institution, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (Commerce Department), the CBO, the GAO, the SSA, and the Boskin Commission itself. They were asked for the (prior) probability they attached to the belief that the CPI was biased less than 0.3% and more than 0.8% before the research program (defined to have begun in 1994) made estimates of the size of the bias. They were also asked, assuming there was a bias in the CPI in the ranges mentioned, for the odds that economists would correctly have predicted the bias (likelihood probabilities).
Results of the Analysis
The interviewees fell into one of three groups. The first were people at the BLS who declined to give specific probabilities ''to stay out of controversy'' and avoid any direct confrontation with members of the commission and those who appointed the commission. Another group was those that held relatively high prior beliefs in CPI bias, who all turned out to be associated with the commission, an indication that perhaps commission members were selected in part for those beliefs. All of the commission's research economists had previously published estimates of bias in the CPI. A third group, primarily representing agencies whose programs are influenced by the CPI, indicated some updating of their beliefs following the 1994 research.
The payoff/probability matrices with three states and three potential actions were split into two parts to illustrate the point that ER may have no measurable value in a BDT framework if the payoffs are such that one action is always preferred to another regardless of the state. For example, in Table 2 the value of the research is 0 when the choice is only between no revision to the CPI and revising it down by 0.3. In this case the policy is obvious given the estimated payoffs and the research messages in circulation, regardless of prior and posterior probabilities. There is always a higher payoff to revising the CPI down by 0.3, all research messages indicated that it was at least this large, and this is the amount that the CPI had been revised as of June 1999.
Opportunities for research benefits arise, however, when the preferred action depends on the state. The analysis in Table 3 considers the interaction of the same states as in Table 2 (<0.3, 0.3-0.8, >0.8), but with a potential action that involves a more dramatic 1.1% reduction in the bias in line with the message coming out of the commission, as compared to a 0.3% reduction favored up to that point by the BLS. The results indicate a positive value for ER, with annual benefits of $15 million, even though there was relatively little difference between the priors and the posteriors. This result, however, does not consider distributional issues associated with changes in the CPI. Nor can tax dollars saved be considered welfare gains per se. If one applies the results of Ballard et al. (1985a, b) and calculated the marginal excess burden of taxation, those net tax dollars saved translate into approximately $3 to $5 million in efficiency gains.
It is possible that distributional impacts might at least partially offset the efficiency gains (Duggan et al. 1996; Erbas and Sayers 1998) . Several large transfer programs, including Social Security, are affected by changes in cost-of-living allowances (COLAs). Twothirds of households that receive Social Security or railroad retirement benefits have family income of less than $25,000. Two-thirds of recipients are over age 65. In 1995, Social Security paid out $332.6 billion. If the CPI were reduced by 1%, the benefits going to each of these groups would be reduced by $2.4 billion annually. On the other hand, additional economy-wide benefits should accrue due to improved monetary policy as a result of more accurate indicators .
Another set of calculations was completed using the probabilities provided by policy makers with ties to the Boskin Commission. These results illustrate the consequences for the value of ER of priors and posteriors that are very close to being the same. These policy makers had strong prior beliefs that the bias was at least 1%, they placed far greater weight on the findings of the commission, and the value of the research message was 0. This result is sensitive to the selection of 1994 as a starting point because these people may have revised their probabilities that there was a bias before that time (and not after), or they may have had personal or political reasons for always considering there to be a large bias. The authors cannot determine this from the interviews. This last result further illustrates that the higher the surprise value of the research, the more the research is worth, a result which may appear obvious, but suggests the value of focusing on research topics for which researchers feel policy makers are less certain about the results of their actions. 6 The potential for researchers to make up their minds ahead of time concerning what their research results should be does not appear to be much of a problem as long as the resulting research message is surprising to policy makers and it is correct.
The analysis assumes that policy makers seek to maximize efficiency, and therefore aggregate economic surplus values were included for the c ij in the initial payoff matrix. It is also possible to substitute economic surplus values that accrue to specific groups as the payoffs in the matrix, perhaps reflecting political weights as viewed by decision makers. Alternatively one could elicit probabilities on the actions, not just the states, in the initial payoff matrix to reflect the odds of specific actions being taken irrespective of the decision makers' priors on states of nature (again to reflect interest group pressure). Neither of these options are explored here.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS
Several lessons for determining the value of economic research can be gleaned from the bias in the CPI case using the political-economic game theory model. First, if one action/state is not highly dominant, it is easier to obtain significant benefits from the research message because it is more likely that the optimal action will be influenced by the research results (holding prestige constant). A related point is that the number of states and actions can influence the results. The fewer the actions and states, the more likely that one action will dominate as the preferred choice, reducing the chances that new information will cause a change in behavior from what would have occurred with prior information only. However, as the number of states and actions grow, the more difficult it becomes to elicit subjective probabilities because the number of survey questions required 6. Although research problems with more surprise potential may be also be the ones that are more difficult and hence more costly to solve, telling somebody something they already are fairly certain about is likely to have little value. expands rapidly. Because defining the problem in terms of fewer states and actions reduces the chances that new information will cause a change in behavior, an analysis with few states and actions is likely to bias downward the estimates of economic research benefits, compared to one with many states and actions.
Second, the size of the difference between prior and likelihood probabilities influences the size of the benefits, and whether any benefits are realized at all. Unless policy makers have confidence in the impartiality of the message source, and the message differs from accepted wisdom or messages from other message services, the message may have little value. The more surprising the information, as reflected by the difference in magnitude between prior and posterior probabilities, the greater the chances of a large research benefit.
Third, payoffs are easiest to calculate in terms of efficiency changes, such as those obtained by rough estimates of economic surplus changes. However, payoffs that actual policy makers consider might reflect responses to pressures from their constituency, lobbyists, or concerns over distributional issues. Corrections to the bias in the CPI may have been made in the name of a substantial gain in efficiency, but clearly there are distributional consequences as well.
Fourth, application of BDT with elicitation of subjective probabilities inevitably relies on the opinions of a small number of people, as only a few people (barring congressional mandate) actually make the decision to implement a specific policy or other institutional change. If more than one decision maker is involved, the need to resolve conflicting opinions may arise.
More theoretical and empirical work on methods for evaluating impacts of economics research could improve accountability. The BDT approach is one possible method despite the difficulties noted. Improvements in accountability might lead to better informed policy decisions as the tools of economics become even more accessible.
